during economic expansions and become more strongly antiimmigration during contractions. 4 While socioeconomic conditions have important effects on antiimmigration politics, they do not comprise an adequate theory.5 The mechanisms through which these factors act are unclear, and there is much they can not explain about cross-country differences in restrictiveness and the timing of policy changes.
As a supplement to economic grievance explanations, many writers have analyzed the role of national-level political factors in immigration restrictions. They hold that factors centered on electoral politics create and encourage antiimmigration mobilization and the adoption of restrictive policies. Since the international system in the postwar period has generally supported liberal immigration policies, analysts have appropriately looked to domestic factors in order to locate the impetus for immigration restrictions. Some argue that the availability of referenda, federalism, and single member districts in national elections ease access to the political agenda for those pressing for restrictions. 6 Others argue that fragmented party systems allow smaller parties, which are less divided on immigration issues than the mass parties of the center-left and center-right, to give voice to antiimmigration interests in parliaments and in governing coalitions.7 Still others argue that national political cultures (for example, of settler societies versus ethnonationalist western Europe) or ius soli versus ius sanguinis legal traditions decisively shape contemporary governments' responses to immigration, especially their citizenship policies.8 While these national political factors may be useful in particular cases and in Anglo-American versus West European comparisons, they are unsatisfactory in several ways. There are now so many of them that as a class of explanations they are nearly unfalsifiable; important cases of relatively successful antiimmigration politics, such as Britain and France, run counter to most of them; and they can not explain the timing of antiimmigration mobilization and restrictive policies.
In these regards, national political processes are more promising as factors to place at the center of explanations of immigration restrictions. These factors include increased voter volatility, the decline of mass parties' electoral strength, the narrowness of the national governing coalition's parliamentary majority, and successes by far right parties in national elections.9 However, the British adoption of immigration controls in 1962, when the Conservatives enjoyed a one hundred seat majority and the party system was stable, contradicts these explanations.
Party competition is more likely to help account for such difficult cases. Dietrich Thranhardt argues that conservative parties in Britain, France, and Germany have repeatedly used race-related issues in efforts to draw voters from the center-left parties, despite very different levels and rates of immigration.'0 This argument implies the need to analyze other factors, besides changes in immigration and unemployment, that could influence national politicians toward antiimmigration positions.
The argument in this article builds on work that explains immigration politics in terms of the actions of subnational politicians and social movements, including violence against immigrants.11 So far, these factors have not been theoretically elaborated and related to the socioeconomic and national political approaches.'2 I do so here in five hypotheses that draw on key insights of studies of immigration politics and political process theories of social movements. 13 Hypothesis 1: The Partial Autonomy of Antiimmigration Politics First, socioeconomic conditions underlying ethnic competition are not closely related to political mobilization that achieves immigration restrictions, although there is some relationship. Socioeconomic conditions create the potential for mobilization strong enough to achieve immigration restrictions, but such mobilization does not automatically develop. Its timing, location, intensity, and protagonists are shaped more by political than by socioeconomic processes. The translation of economic grievances into political action is hindered by key features of immigration politics: national politicians from the parties of government tend to maintain a consensus on liberal policies; the geographic concentration of immigrants limits the number of native citizens who feel threatened by immigration; and actors trying to raise issues that elites exclude from the political agenda have collective action problems.14 Hypothesis 2: Subnational Mobilization Second, antiimmigration mobilization by state or local politicians precedes and influences national campaigns for and the adoption of immigration restrictions. Antiimmigration positions have a potential electoral payoff but are unlikely to receive a serious national hearing unless actors outside the circle of national political elites make them appear to be pressing public problems and therefore electorally important issues. Majorities or large minorities of the population in most West European countries have antiimmigrant attitudes; for example, 40-65 percent of citizens in eight out of twelve countries recently agreed that "there are too many foreigners" in their country.15 But the issue of immigration control is seldom a high priority for voters, and the issue's salience depends largely on whether politicians draw public attention to it. National politicians are unlikely to do so because they usually participate in a consensus in which they tacitly agree to uphold liberal immigration policies and not to appeal to the antiimmigrant sentiments of the public.'6 National politicians are reluctant to break the taboo against apparently racist or xenophobic positions for many reasons. Business prefers liberal immigration policies, and antiimmigration statements might benefit the far right, stir up racism and racist violence, anger foreign governments, and tarnish the country's international reputation for liberalism. A politician or party which is seen as breaking the taboo might be excluded from coalition government or party leadership.
Subnational politicians are more likely to introduce antiimmigration positions to the agenda, partly because they are less bound by the terms of the liberal consensus. They are more distant from responsibility for the national state's image abroad; they communicate less with national political elites and more with local leaders and ordinary citizens; and they may see antiimmigration politics as a potential means of gaining national attention and enhancing their careers, even if it is also a potentially disreputable and risky path. Furthermore, many immigrant groups are concentrated in urban and industrial areas, as are the native working class populations who might compete with immigrants for jobs and housing and who are disproportionately prone to vote for antiimmigration parties.17 This geographic concentration implies that antiimmigration mobilization may occur in certain localities although the country as a whole is not strongly affected.
Hypothesis 3: Social Movement Activity Third, subnational politicians often act under pressure from antiimmigration social movements at the local or state level. By social movements I mean sustained efforts by challengers, those who lack routine access to authoritative decision makers, to mobilize a constituency to achieve a public goal. Their efforts usually include activities, such as petitions, demonstrations, and violence, that disrupt the normal routines of electoral and interest group politics. Social movements are challengers that possess a degree of organization; they can be formal organizations or loosely organized groups.18 In antiimmigration politics relevant social movement groups and activities include public meetings and petitions by antiimmigration residents' groups, violence against immigrants by native youth groups, and local election campaigns by far right parties. In both Britain and Germany far right parties are clearly outsiders to the political game, unable to participate in coalitions, hence social movement organizations. For the reasons given under the second hypothesis, antiimmigration social movements are more likely to emerge and target politicians at the local or state than at the national level.
This argument contrasts sharply with that of Jeannette Money. She holds that the actions of local politicians reflect the demands of voters, which in turn reflect local immigration, unemployment, and other economic conditions.'9 I argue that these kinds of economic factors do not determine the timing and location of antiimmigration mobilization at the state or local level. Rather, the responses of subnational politicians are strongly influenced by actual or potential social movement activities, which in turn depend on political processes (see Hypothesis 5 below) that can not be reduced to socioeconomic factors. Hypothesis 4: Dramatic Events Fourth, national politicians are extremely responsive to local or state-level events which major news media report to be dramatic expressions of citizens' opposition to immigrants. Such dramatic events include mass violence against immigrants and electoral victories by candidates or parties that use antiimmigration appeals in unusually overt, emotional, or racist ways. Social movement organizations can be important in initiating such dramatic events because they are not bound by the liberal consensus on immigration. Furthermore, social movements can attract publicity to the antiimmigration cause while allowing politicians to play the role of the moderate seeking compromise rather than of the racist trying to fan the flames of discontent.
Dramatic antiimmigrant events can influence national politicians to abandon the liberal consensus by convincing them that antiimmigrant sentiment is strong enough to pose an electoral threat or offer a payoff. The gap between elites' liberal consensus and the public's antiimmigrant attitudes makes national politicians deeply ambivalent about immigration. Above all, politicians have poor information about the extent to which the native population perceives ethnic competition and immigration to be serious problems. Reliable information about constituents' preferences is especially difficult to get in this policy area because voters as well as their leaders often regard openly expressed antiimmigrant sentiment as racist or xenophobic and therefore taboo. Yet, when leading news media pay attention to antiimmigrant events, many national politicians will likely revise their estimates of the intensity of constituents' preferences and thus make possible new alignments and shifts in policy.
Hypothesis 5: The Politics of Social Movement Mobilization Fifth, social movement activities against immigrants depend on both favorable subnational political opportunity structures and available social movement organizations. Favorable political opportunity structures are those which, according to Tilly, create a relatively high probability that a group's interests will be advanced ("opportunity") and relatively low costs or risks of taking collective action ("facilitation" rather than "repression").20 For local antiimmigrant movements, two key elements of a favorable political opportunity structure are the availability of potential allies among local or state politicians, who may take antiimmigrant or antiimmigration positions publicly, and passivity by police when antiimmigrant violence is initiated. Social movement organizations are important for mobilization because they help to solve the free-rider problem of collective action; even small, informally organized groups can do so by socially rewarding and sanctioning their members.21 But the availability of antiimmigration residents' associations, far right parties, and racist youth groups depends on local factors, such as the prior history of mobilization and the present condition of local leadership.
Case Selection
A test of these hypotheses requires the study of a small number of cases in some depth. I selected cases on the dependent variable and sought to maximize the differ-ences between the cases on a large number of contextual variables, an appropriate approach when testing for hypothetically necessary conditions.22 Therefore, I chose two countries as contexts in which to identify more temporally bound cases of antiimmigration mobilization leading to restrictive policies: Britain (Caribbean and South Asian immigration, 1958-1965) and Germany (immigration by political asylum seekers from Africa, Asia, Turkey, and eastern Europe, 1980-1993). Asylum seekers typically were able to remain in Germany for five to ten years while their cases were decided and often could remain on humanitarian grounds even if their applications were denied; hence they are immigrants in the sense of this article. 23 These Antiimmigration pressure from local government also helped to put the issue on the top of the political agenda in Bonn and therefore helped force the federal government into adopting restrictions before the October Bundestag election. For example, soon after the Baden-Wuiirttemberg election Essen mayor Horst Katzor (SPD) drew headlines by refusing to accept more asylum seekers. Katzor was in a strong position to pressure the federal government; he enjoyed the support of the association of municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia, which he headed, and had personal influence with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. 60 Where local officials were reluctant to accept more asylum seekers, for example, in many Baden-Wurttemberg communities in 1980, they were motivated by potential social movement activities by local citizens groups and not merely by the costs created by the new arrivals.6' Since much of the cost of social assistance and housing was reimbursed by state governments, finding suitable housing in their jurisdiction for asylum seekers was the biggest challenge local government faced. It was made difficult by the reactions of German neighbors. Based on prior experience, local officials feared opposition from neighborhood groups if they tried to create asylum hostels or seize school gymnasiums or private apartments. 62 Antiimmigration mobilization was aided by West Germany's decentralized political institutions, which give the states representation in the Bundesrat and make subnational governments responsible for asylum seekers' housing and social assistance. But these institutions were not sufficient to produce mobilization or to guarantee the partial successes it achieved in 1980. Nor can the institutional framework explain why Baden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria were far out in front of the other states in both their demands and their tactics, a pattern which continued into the 1990s. However, the center-right leaders of these states may have responded to the threat of mobilization by far right parties. The neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) did very well in the south in the late 1960s, gaining 7-10 percent of the vote, and in Bavaria intraparty tensions grew so serious that right-wing activists broke from the CSU to form the radical-right Republikaner party in 1983. 63 The 1980 German case also supports the dramatic event thesis, although in a peculiar way. An SPD-FDP federal government adopted restrictions in 1980, despite its traditional commitments to liberal asylum rights and good relations with Turkey, in part because the government was concerned about potential social unrest. Resistance by local governments had created uncertainty about potential reactions from the German population. Moreover, in their statements state prime minister Lothar Spath and other Baden-Wuiirttemberg politicians often used rhetoric that hinted at disorder and violence: seizing school gymnasiums to house asylum seekers would lead to a "civil uprising"; too many asylum seekers might lead to "aggressions"; a "social and ethnic explosive [was] being brewed together"; and federal inaction would necessitate "civil-war-like discussions."64 Moreover, neo-Nazi violence and other activities had been rising sharply since 1977, with the help of younger, more action-oriented recruits, and some of these groups were beginning to target guest workers with violence.65
Although no dramatic antiimmigrant events occurred, in spring 1980 it was difficult to know what might happen at the grass roots, and therefore the fear of dramatic events was sufficient to result in restrictions. The federal interior minister Baum was particularly concerned that the mobilization against asylum seekers could spill over into xenophobia expressed toward guest workers. 66 In an important Bundestag address in which he endorsed visa requirements for asylum seekers, Baum stressed that guest workers were not a burden on the state and argued that the arrival of asylum seekers, by contrast, was a cause for concern. "Emotions were being awakened," he said, in part because some communities were overburdened, but also in part because "emotions are being stirred up."67
The Politics of the Constitutional Amendment to the Asylum Article, 1991-1993 The passage of Article 16a of the German Basic Law in May 1993 went far beyond the asylum restrictions adopted in the 1980s. By undercutting access to a fullfledged judicial appeals process for most asylum seekers, it greatly reduced applications.68 As in 1980, the policy change followed a major increase in immigration, 300,000 asylum seekers a year during 1990-1993. Moreover, an economic contraction began in eastern Germany soon after economic unification in 1990 and spread to western Germany. Popular riots and other antiforeigner violence were widely interpreted as evidence that public concern with the asylum issue was intense. Adult German residents, whom the press and politicians regarded as "normal citizens," joined skinheads in antiforeigner riots in Hoyerswerda (September 1991) and Rostock (August 1992). These riots had a particularly profound effect on the asylum debate and the SPD's switch in position. The riots, together with government unwillingness to repress antiforeigner violence, provided proamendment forces with the argument that asylum reform was needed in order to head off further violence. For example, the head of the chancellor's office rejected the SPD's demands for special police units to protect asylum seekers after the riots on the grounds that it was pointless to "cure symptoms" when the real problem was the legal right to asylum.76 In the wake of such statements, the SPD called an emergency party meeting for mid November, which accepted the need to amend Article 16. The federal government, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), did not call for a major crackdown on antiforeigner violence until after the murder of a Turkish guest worker's family in November 1992. 77 The riots in eastern Germany were caused by social movement organizations that met with favorable political opportunity structures at the local level, not primarily by economic grievances. In both riot cities unemployment was below the average for eastern Germany, and the foreign population was actually declining in Hoyerswerda. Riots occurred because cultural conflicts between foreign and German residents over matters such as noise and garbage were not channeled into other forms of citizen participation, and police allowed violence to escalate.78 The conditions necessary for antiforeigner riots were quite uncommon, even in eastern Germany. Although asylum seekers were sent to about one hundred different counties and cities in the eastern states, only five localities experienced riots on consecutive days, and only Hoyerswerda, Rostock, and Quedlinburg had riots involving hundreds of adults. 79 When authorities removed asylum seekers from the Hoyerswerda and Rostock neighborhoods where they were attacked, this apparent capitulation to the rioters' demands helped trigger attacks on foreigners in hundreds of locations in eastern and western Germany.80 Skinhead and neo-Nazi groups carried out 500 firebombings and 1500 other violent crimes per year during 1991-1993, mostly against asylum seekers.8' The violence affected many SPD-governed states more strongly than the center-right-governed southern states.82 The attacks were widely reported, and the reports added urgency to the decision-making process within the SPD.
Conclusions
All five hypotheses concerning subnational mobilization and social movements were largely confirmed by the cases analyzed here. First, the political processes that mediate between socioeconomic conditions and policies often have a life of their own.
These processes led to restrictions in Britain at a time when the economy was nearly at full employment and businesses needed black migrant labor. Immigration rates increased dramatically in Britain only because leading politicians responded to the London riots with loud calls for immigration control. Although asylum seekers burdened state governments in Germany, ideological motivations were stronger than material interests for more than a decade, as only some of the conservative states strongly opposed the liberal federal policy and the SPD-governed states were unwilling to push for restrictions. In defiance of the logic of ethnic competition, the antiimmigrant backlash in Germany was strongly concentrated against asylum seekers, who were not allowed to work or live in normal housing, rather than against the five million guest workers and their families, who were much more likely to compete with Germans for jobs and apartments.
Second, state and local politicians, not national ones, were in the vanguard of the antiimmigration forces during the long periods when the immigration control issue developed into a major political theme. Mobilization by state or local elites preceded and influenced national debates over restrictive policies in every case examined here, implying that it may be a necessary condition of strong and effective national mobilization for immigration control.
Third, subnational politicians acted not purely on their own initiative, but rather under pressure, or potential pressure, from social movement organizations. Social movements involved a wide range of groups and activities, from respectable to disreputable, from voting to discussions to violence. The underlying message often seemed to be the same: the immigrants already in the country were unwelcome, and additional immigration was unwanted.
Fourth, dramatic antiimmigrant events have a major impact on national politics because national elites strain to read the public mood on immigration. The timing of dramatic events helps explain why controls on black immigration in Britain were adopted so early and at such low levels of immigration and unemployment but why the constitutional asylum right in Germany was abridged at a relatively late date and only after very large increases in immigration and unemployment. In Britain antiblack rioting broke the liberal consensus already in 1958, paving the way for local organizations to mobilize resolutions, petition signatures, and votes for the antiimmigration cause. The riots also set the tone for national interpretations of later local events. They made it more likely that the Conservative Party would give strong weight to local party resolutions and petitions that represented only a small minority of voters and that the Labour Party would overinterpret the Smethwick election. In Germany more than ten years of mobilization against asylum rights by the CSU and parts of the CDU failed to achieve relatively effective controls on asylum seekers because suitable dramatic events did not occur until the early 1990s. Before 1991 violence against asylum seekers was limited to a few small neo-Nazi organizations without support from local residents. The vague threat of dramatic events in spring 1980 was enough to force visa and employment restrictions that year but not enough for the constitutional change sought by some center-right party leaders. The early 1990s were different in that riots and far right electoral successes seemed to show that "normal citizens" finally were strongly concerned about asylum rights. Even the SPD's more ideological activists and leaders, bitter at what seemed like blackmail by the center-right parties and the far right, interpreted these local events to indicate a pressing need for immigration controls.
Finally, these dramatic events were produced by social movement organizations operating in favorable local political environments, not simply by economic grievances. Many places in western Europe have had immigrants and unemployment; only a very few have experienced antiimmigrant riots or electoral victories by outrageously antiimmigrant candidates. The places that host such events present unusual combinations of organizations and opportunities: social movement groups, sympathetic or blundering subnational elites, and police who respond passively to antiimmigrant violence. For these reasons, dramatic antiimmigrant events are uncommon and not closely related to increases in immigration or unemployment. But when dramatic events occur, precisely their uncommonness makes them frightening. National politicians are prone to overinterpret them as expressions of more widespread political processes which, they fear, may be emerging. 1. The focus here is somewhat narrower than the question why restrictions are adopted in all cases, even those lacking public mobilization. The latter are influenced by state actors' desire to preempt the kinds of processes described here.
